Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is an enabling technology for NASA's Distributed Air-Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM) concept. DAG-TM has the goal of significantly increasing capacity within the National Airspace System, while maintaining or improving safety. Under DAG-TM, aircraft exchange state and intent information over ADS-B with other aircraft and ground stations. This information supports various surveillance functions including conflict detection and resolution, scheduling, and conformance monitoring.
Introduction
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is an enabling technology for an operational concept under study by NASA that has the goal of significantly increasing capacity within the National Airspace System (NAS). Distributed Air Ground Trafic Management (DAG-TM) represents a paradigm shift from a centralized, ground-based air traffic management system to a distributed network involving pilots, Air Traffic Service Providers (ATSPs), and aeronautical operational control centers [l] .
Under DAG-TM, separation assurance responsibilities are assigned to the most appropriate decision maker. Pilots flying appropriately equipped "autonomous" aircraft fly under Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR), where they are allowed to choose their own routes subject to maintaining separation from all other aircraft and conforming to traffic flow management constraints. ATSPs continue to provide separation services to "managed aircraft unequipped for autonomous operations. Managed aircraft fly under today's Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and operate in the same airspace as autonomous aircraft. ATSPs also issue waypoint constraints to all aircraft when needed to meet local traffic flow management needs.
All aircraft flying in a DAG-TM environment use ADS-B to transmit position, velocity, and intent information to nearby aircraft and ground stations. ADS-B satisfies DAG-TM's requirement for collaborative information sharing between system participants. Accurate and reliable state and trajectory information provided by ADS-B supports various DAG-TM surveillance functions including conflict detection and resolution, scheduling, and conformance monitoring. 
ADS-B Message Generation
Air Traflc Operatiom Simulation ATOS places a heavy emphasis on maintaining appropriate levels of compatibility with real-world avionics system architectures. The ATOS is instantiated by a computer-workstation based airspace simulation that consists of many components, as shown in Figure 1 below. The components include twelve individual simulated aircraft piloted by a single pilot, multiple pseudopilot workstations in which multiple simulated aircraft can be controlled by a single operator, a local air traffic generation tool to provide additional background traffic, and a link to the air traffic control services provided by an offsite facility. This offsite facility, the NASA Ames Airspace Operations Laboratory, is connected through an Intemet gateway that convertS ADS-B, CPDLC, and other data into the appropriate format for each site. All ATOS components, including this Intemet gateway, are linked together by a High-Level Architecture (HLA) bus for data communications. Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) document (RTCADO-242A) [3] . Although, as described below, the DO-242A specification has been extended in certain areas to support new airbome conflict management functions performed by the Langley-developed Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP), great care has been taken to maintain the underlying assumptions and limitations inherent in the industry standard.
Each individual simulated aircraft within ATOS is called an Aircraft Simulation for Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR). Within each ASTOR, ADS-B data are handled through different processes depending on whether an ownship outgoing message is being created or a traffic incoming message is being analyzed. For outgoing messages, the data are generated by the appropriate ASTOR component such as the Flight Management Computer (FMC), AOP, or autopilot'autothrottle system and then assembled for transmission by AOP and sent to a simulated ADS-B transponder for broadcast. Incoming messages from nearby traffic aircraft are received by the same simulated ADS-B transponder, and are assembled into reports and then placed onto a newly defined channel of a simulated ARINC 429 data bus [4] for intemal transport to any ASTOR avionics components making use of ADS-B data.
The data that are passed between the various
Development of ADS-B Message Elements
The ADS-B specification in RTCADO-242A describes the content of the various reports used for surveillance applications. Three of these reports are especially useful for estimating the flight trajectory of nearby traffic aircraft. The first of these report types is the State Vector (SV) report, which contains an aircraft's three-dimensional position and velocity. The second report is the Target State (TS) report, which contains information on the horizontal and vertical targets of an aircraft's flight guidance system for the current flight segment. The final report type is the Trajectory Change (TC) repod, which describes the characteristics of one Trajectory Change Point (TCP) and its preceding flight segment. These characteristics include the latitude and longitude, track to and from the TCP, tum radius, expected crossing altitude and time, and various conformance flags. Multiple TC reports are used to describe the series of TCPs that comprise a portion of either the commandorplannedtrajectory of the aircraft. AOP generates both of these trajectories for the own aircraft and the differences between them are described below.
The ADS-B MASPS differentiates between two types of aircraft flight path trajectories [3, 5] . The first is the command trajectory, which is the path the aircraft will fly unless the pilot engages a new flight guidance mode or changes the targets for the active or upcoming guidance modes. Although changes to the command trajectory usually result from specific pilot actions, changes may also occur as a result of non-programmed guidance mode transitions or reversions due to, for example, an overspeed condition. In contrast, the planned trajectory includes flight segments that are dependent upon the pilot engaging a new guidance mode. An example of the difference between command and planned trajectories is the case of an aircraft at FL3 10 descending towards a flight plan waypoint that has a crossing restriction of 17,000 feet, with a selected autopilot limit altitude of FL240. Although the planned trajectory descends all the way to 17,000 feet, the command trajectory levels out at FL240 because the aircraft will level out at that altitude without further pilot action.
Because the command trajectory describes the currently programmed flight path of the aircraft, it is considered to represent the best estimate of the aircraft's current intent and is therefore given broadcast priority over the planned trajectory [3] . The TC report shucture enables the receiving system to clearly distinguish between the command and planned trajectories. example, state vector data including position, north and east velocities, barometric and geometric altitudes, and vertical speed are taken directly from channels such as the FMC general output channel, the air data computer channel, and the GPS and/or inertial reference system channels. In contrast, some of the mode status data including participant category and class codes, and aircraft size code, are stored within the transponder itseIf because these values are essentially invariant for each modeled ADS-B participant. Because ATOS does not currently support a mixture of surveillance capabilities, most elements from the Mode Status Report are not provided. Some other data must be newly generated from multiple sources for each transmission. For example, data for the target state message requires additional processing because depending on the active lateral and vertical guidance modes, the target heading and altitude may require combining information from both the FMC flight plan as well as the selected values in the Mode Control Panel (MCP).
Because the current ASTOR architecture relies upon the advanced trajectory processing capability within AOP to produce the series of TCPs that will be broadcast over ADS-B, the AOP must have access to the necessary data describing the future flight path of the ownship aircraft. AOP extracts this needed data primarily from the FMC trajectory intent channel, which includes data blocks for each trajectory change point in both the active and modified (if one exists) navigation routes stored in the FMC. When AOP assembles the trajectory change messages, however, it only uses up to four TCPs from the FMC. This limitation is maintained for operational realism because it is unlikely that many of the initial ADS-B implementations will support even this many TCPs [2] .
When the aircraft is flying under FMC guidance modes, the data for each trajectory change point includes the location and FMC predicted crossing altitude, airspeed, and time. Because the broadcast TCPs must reflect the command trajectory, the FMC flight plan TCPs cannot be sent out unmodified AOP must consider the active or anticipated flights modes, as well as autopilot system targets and current aircraft states to determine the proper command trajectory. AOP sends the command trajectory TCPs to the ADS-B transponder for transmission to other participants. change messages currently exceeds the FMC trajectory intent channel's defmed contents as specified in ARINC 702A, the extensions are limited and should be easily available within the FMC. The block-data transfer format of the trajectory intent channel eliminates the need for any new ARINC 429 word label assignments. 
Although the data included in the trajectory

ADS-B Performance Modeling
Range
Equations 1 and 2 give the maximum no interference range as a function of transmitter and receiver antenna power, cable loss, and standard free space loss. The maximum range is defined as having 90% probability of reception with no interference. Figure 3 shows the no interference probability of reception vs. range. The maximum range simulated in the experiment is 81 NM. This value was chosen to be slightly less than the 90 NM minimum prescribed by the ADS-B MASPS for Class A3 equipment [3] . This value limits the number of messages received by AOP and improves its processing performance.
where a is the standard free space loss at 1090 MHZ, a = 1.188e-5 mw-NM, and LFs in dB is the maximum allowable signal power transmission loss.
LFS is defined in Equation 2
and is a function of minimum triggering received power level (MTL), Mode S transmitter power (FT), cable loss (LTc), transmitter antenna gain (GT), receiver antenna gain (GR), and receiver cable loss (LRc). Transmitter power is set to 500 watts or 54 dBm and MTL is set to 3.686~10.~ watt or -88.67 a m , which both conform with recommended high-end system performance [2]. Cable loss (LTc or LRc) is assumed to be 50% or -3dB of original send or receiving power and no antenna gain loss is assumed.
LFS = MTL -{PT
+ LTC + GT + Gn + LRC) (2)
Message Reception VaIidity
Message reception validity is modeling message collision effects caused by interference from various radar interrogation replies and messages over 1090 MHz. A message collision occurs if the broadcast time interval from two separate messages or replies overlap partially or completely. Message collisions in the current ATOS implementation are due to:
Mode S short messages [7] (56 bit, 64 psec), which include ground surveillance, data link, All-Call interrogation, and TCAS, and Mode S long messages (1 12 bit, 120 psec), which include ground data link (GDL), ADS-B position message, ADS-B velocity message, ID message, and on-demand squitter (ODS) message.
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ASTOR's Mode-S probability of having correct message reception is determined by Equation 3 and is based on a Poisson probability distribution 
(6)
= Ni x F.. 'I where Ni is the number of aircraft in range emitting a particular type of interference and Fij is the broadcast rate for the corresponding type. Default values used in the simulation are shown in Table 1 . . Although a real ADS-B receiving system may require several incoming messages to assemble a report, the current simulation conveys all information needed for a report in a single message. Therefore, the report update interval is equal to the corresponding message broadcast rate multiplied by the probability of correct message reception (~Y~L~~ from Equation 3). ASTOR updates traffic aircraft positions every second, coasting a target up to 30 seconds if a new message is not received. Resulting update intervals due to the message broadcast rates in Table 2 are notably faster than those currently prescribed in the ADS-B MASPS [3] . The decision to use these values was due to cunent AOP separation assurance performance limitations that require high information update rates and to satisfy Joint Experiment lab connectivity needs. Future ATOS enhancements will work to reduce this performance gap. the desired traffic level. Subject pilots flew four different trafKc scenarios for each of the four conditions, using a within-subjects design.
Ft. Worth area and is shown in Figure 4 . Subject controllers staffed the Amarillo, Ardmore, and Wichita Falls High Sectors and the Bowie Low sector. A pseudo controller handled each "ghost" sector and performed handoff duties to the subject controllers. Aircraft flew in the ghost sectors, but no data were collected there. Each subject pilot flew two overflights and two arrivals for each experimental condition. Overtlights crossed either the Amarillo or Ardmore High sectors. For arriving aircraft, two streams began in level flight in Amarillo or Ardmore and both included a descent to cross the BAMBE meter fix at 250 knots and 11,000 ft. The subject controller used a scheduler to assign required times of arrival at BAh4BE to each arriving aircraft. The scenario ended for each subject pilot when he or she crossed the high altitude sector for ovefflights or the B M E fix for arrivals. Controllers continued to work traffic until all subject pilots from Ames and Langley had finished.
The experimental airspace modeled the Dallas
Figure 4. Joint Experiment Airspace
Traffic levels for the three high altitude sectors are provided in Table 3 . All were established by a controller workload study conducted by Ames. During this study, traffic levels (containing only managed aircraft) were ramped up in each sector.
The L1 level was set at the point where controller workload was judged to be manageable, but challenging. The LZ and L3 levels were set a proportional amount higher than L1, with each level determined to be above the amount that a controller could handle if all aircraft were managed. Traffic levels were varied by changing the number of overflights, while arrivals were held constant. The Bowie Low sector contained no overflights and was therefore at a constant traffic level across all test conditions. 
ADS-B Model Performance Results
air ADS-B model performance used during the experiment. Figures 5 and 6 give the probability of message reception vs. range to the target aircraft for Langley subject pilot overflights and amvals, respectively. Points are derived from a histogram with 10 NM bins (centered at each point) that . Range to Target AlrCran (NM) Figure 6 . BAMBE Arrival ADS-B Message Reception Probability probability of reception at the higher traffic levels. Performance curves tend to follow the no interference probability of reception vs. range shown in Figure 3 .
Because the density of traffic does not necessarily remain constant for the entire run, the message collision probability may vary as an aircraft progresses toward the meter iix. Figure 7 shows the message collision probability as a function of distance to the BAMBE meter 6. For clarity, the figure only shows every hundredth message received for all amving ASTOR aircraft.
As expected, each aircraft encounters more traffic as it nears the meter fix, thereby causing the probability of message collision to increase. 
Scenario
Conclusions
Feasibility assessments of advanced operational concepts such as DAG-TM will need to include reliable performance modeling of all enabling technologies. The concept can only work as intended when assumptions of system capabilities used for simulation are in line with current and anticipated real-world system performance.
in the Joint Experiment represents a first step toward a real-world representation. Message elements comply well with established ADS-B standards and those elements are largely supported through limited extensions to existing ARINC data buses.
To make the ATOS ADS-B model more compatible with existing systems, Mode A and C aircraft effects must be included and simulations should be carried out at higher traffic levels. These enhancements will also drive improvements to AOP and ASTOR system handling of dropped or otherwise unavailable messages. Real ADS-B systems are held to a very high standard. The ADS-B MASPS requires all proposed ADS-B applications to comply with its specifications under the LA Basin 2020 environment [3] . Proposed
The ADS-B performance model implemented
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operational concepts must ultimately conform to these rigid standards and performance capabilities.
Recent development work at Lincoln Lab is showing promising results for improving 1090 MHz ADS-B signals in the presence of Mode A and C reply interference [I 11 . Further developments to the ATOS ADS-B model as well as ongoing 1090 MHz system enhancements should help bridge the gap between assumed DAG-TM data link capabilities and actual operational performance.
